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Executive Overview 
 
The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) is a bipartisan, non-profit, non-
governmental organization committed to education and promotion of a responsible budget 
process. CRFB is currently working on the Moment of Truth Project promoting the Simpson-
Bowles report from the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. In support of 
CRFB I have put together a report to (1) establish how the fiscal commission developed the 
Simpson-Bowles policy package, (2) understand how the media framed the package and how it 
affected public opinion, and (3) use John Kingdon’s garbage can model to question whether 
Simpson-Bowles has a policy future. 
Section I:  A “Legislative” History on the Simpson-Bowles Package (Page 6) 
In this section I trace the fiscal commission from its start in February 2010 through the 
final vote in December. I discuss the varied expectations for the commission, their structure and 
sources of policy ideas, how they negotiated with outside groups and commission members, 
the reasoning behind members’ votes, the immediate criticism Simpson-Bowles received, and 
what has changed since 2010. While this section doesn’t draw any conclusions, it analyzes 
where the policy ideas came from, discusses the different players who had a stake in the 
outcome, and highlights the key decisions and how they were made.  
Section II: The Media Framing of the Simpson-Bowles Package (Page 16) 
The press often refers to Simpson-Bowles in broad, vague, or even misleading terms. 
This section discusses how the package was framed by the media and the general consensus 
among newspapers across the country. I look at editorials from regional newspapers and 
compare their content to coverage in the New York Times or Washington post. My analysis 
shows that Simpson-Bowles was received well by the media, and was lauded as “good 
government” and unlikely compromise. However, it also warns that by not educating the public 
on the content of the proposals in the package, the “good government” argument may break 
down. 
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Section III: The Public Response to the Simpson-Bowles Package (Page 21) 
 In conjunction with the media analysis, I look at public polling data on Simpson-Bowles 
to measure the public’s response. The data help inform whether the discussion surrounding the 
package has caused a shift in overall public awareness for fiscal problems as well as the most 
effective ways of discussing particular elements of the package. For example, support for 
proposed changes in Social Security and Medicare were low, but when packaged with other 
ideas (such as closing tax loopholes) or qualified by protecting lower-income groups levels of 
support increased significantly. This section highlights the importance of question specificity 
when gauging public opinion. 
Section IV: The Simpson-Bowles Package & the Policy Stream: Are They Still Alive? (Page 25) 
 The public narrative, as seen in the media and public response, tells a mixed story. The 
current state, and future, of the Simpson-Bowles package appears uncertain at best. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the package is still viable. In this section I apply 
John Kingdon’s garbage can model to the Simpson-Bowles package, and show how the policy 
may still be alive. This model says that problems, policy ideas, and politics exist as three 
independent processes, but you don’t see real action until all three come together. Meanwhile, 
ideas are in the garbage can waiting until the right time. Today our fiscal problems still exist, 
and Simpson-Bowles may be the go-to policy plan, but the package has yet to earn the political 
endorsements needed to move it forward.  
Section V: Simpson-Bowles: Lessons Learned (Page 30) 
 Simpson-Bowles lost traction because it lacked political support. In the future, support 
from Congressional leadership and especially the President would help the package. 
 The media generally support Simpson-Bowles as centrist and a meaningful compromise, 
but also have not educated the public on the content. The package’s critics may 
eventually break through the “good government” frame. 
 As policy tradeoffs are introduced and discussed, support for the whole package 
increases. Simpson-Bowles needs to be discussed specifically and holistically.   
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Policy Question & Background on Simpson-Bowles: Process & Content 
Project Overview & Policy Questions 
In December 2012, Ezra Kelin wrote in the Washington Post that Simpson-Bowles 
“occupies strange territory in Washington.” He summarizes his point saying: “Almost every 
politician professes to admire it, almost none of them are willing to vote for it, and almost none 
of its supporters know what's in it.”1 This paper starts to make sense of this essential question: 
what explains the perplexing policy status of the Simpson-Bowles fiscal package? 
This case study reviews the media’s coverage and framing of the package, the public’s 
response, the political climate, and key decisions made along the way. The goal is to accurately 
describe the entire process behind and content of the proposal, and tie together what political 
science tells us with what happened in the media, public, and political sectors.  
The project traces the development and considers the possible future of the Simpson-
Bowles fiscal reform proposal. What happened to the Simpson-Bowles proposals, and why? 
How did the media frame the proposals, and did it affect public opinion? How did lawmakers 
interpret and understand the Simpson-Bowles package and its elements? Is the package dead, 
or does Simpson-Bowles still have a future? 
The Fiscal Problem 
In response to the increasing federal debt and deficit, President Obama formed The 
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. The idea for a Commission originated 
with the efforts Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND) and Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) to form a 
Congressional Task Force addressing the nation’s fiscal problems.  
In December of 2009, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad (D-ND) and 
Ranking Member Judd Gregg (R-NH) introduced a bill to form a “Bipartisan Task Force for 
                                                          
1 Ezra Klein, “11 Shocking, True Facts about Simpson-Bowles,” Washington Post, accessed April 18, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/04/11-shocking-true-facts-about-simpson-
bowles/. 
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Responsible Fiscal Action.”2 In January of 2010, their proposal received a vote in the Senate.3 
Seven of the bill’s original cosponsors, including Senators McCain (R-AZ), Inhofe (R-OK), and 
future Fiscal Commission Member Crapo (R-ID), voted against it. These members, all 
Republicans, were threatened with primary challengers.4 After the losing Senate vote, the 
President announced an Executive Commission as an alternative approach.5 The Presidential 
Commission moved the initiative forward, yet it lacked the enforcement mechanisms that the 
congressional proposal had included. Specifically, it would now require more support to bring a 
commission package to a vote in Congress. 
In early 2010 spending as a percentage of GDP was at its highest since WWII 
(approximately 24%). Tax revenues were the lowest since 1950 (approximately 15%).6 As a 
result, the annual deficit and long-term debt was continuing to grow. Many fiscal experts 
argued that the path was unsustainable. The national debt had risen from 33% of GDP to 62% 
of GDP in the nine years leading up to the creation of the National Fiscal Commission.7 
With less revenue coming in but more demand for safety net programs, the economic 
recession put heavier burdens on federal spending. Despite this added pressure, the economic 
recession was not the only, or even primary, cause of fiscal stress, and those involved in the 
creation of the Fiscal Commission worried that economic recovery would not resolve the fiscal 
challenges. They argued that, according to CBO projections, the rate of government spending 
would cause the debt held by the public to reach nearly 70% of GDP by 2020.8 
 
 
                                                          
2 Kent Conrad, “S.2853 - 111th Congress (2009-2010): Bipartisan Task Force for Responsible Fiscal Action Act of 
2009,” legislation, December 10, 2009, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/2853. 
3 Kent Conrad, “S.Amdt.3302 to S.Amdt.3299 to H.J.Res.45 - 111th Congress (2009-2010) | Congress.gov | Library 
of Congress,” legislation, January 26, 2010, http://beta.congress.gov/amendment/111th-congress/senate-
amendment/3302. 
4 Kent Conrad, April 7, 2014. 
5 Congressional Staff, April 4, 2014. 
6 The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth, 2010. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The Congressional Budget Office, Federal Debt and Interest Costs, December 14, 2010. 
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Development of the Fiscal Commission 
In February 2010, President Obama signed an Executive Order creating The National 
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform.9 He appointed former Senator Alan Simpson 
(R-WY) and former Clinton White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles (D-NC) to co-chair the 
Commission. The Commission worked with budget experts, congressional offices, private 
sector, and union leaders on proposals to fix the fiscal challenges facing the country. If the final 
report had earned at least 14 of 18 votes, the package would have gone to Congress for an up 
or down vote. But in December 2010, the proposal received only 11 votes on the Commission.10 
The political climate influenced both the way President Obama set up the Commission 
and made it difficult to get 14 votes. The House and Senate Majority and Minority leaders 
appointed twelve Members of Congress, six from each legislative chamber divided equally 
between political parties. The President appointed the remaining six members, including the 
co-chairs (see Appendix A). In requiring a super-majority of 14 votes, this structure ensured that 
any proposals passed by the commission would have significant bipartisan support.11  
The Simpson-Bowles Fiscal Package 
The Simpson-Bowles package aimed to reduce the deficit to 2.2% of GDP by 2014. The 
package consisted of six major proposals:12 
1. A series of discretionary cuts, or funding coming from the annually appropriated 
spending bills, essentially boiling down to $3 in spending reductions for every $1 
of new taxes.13 Spending would be labeled as either security or non-security, and 
would have sharp percentage cuts on both sides. This proposal also includes 
governmental reforms such as freezes in federal employee pay, cuts to 
Presidential and Congressional budgets, and the elimination of earmarks. 
                                                          
9 Barack Obama and The White House, Executive Order 13531 -- National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and 
Reform, 2010. 
10 “FiscalCommission.gov,” 2010. 
11 The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth. 
12 Ibid. 
13 John J. Hamre, “A Threat to National Security,” Science, October 19, 2012. 
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2. Comprehensive tax reform, based in theory on the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which 
lowers rates and grows the base.14 The proposal achieves this with what was 
coined the “zero plan,”15 eliminating all income tax expenditures in the tax code 
and using the reforms to reduce the deficit and add back a small number of 
necessary expenditures. Under this plan, the income tax rates could be lowered 
to 8%, 14%, or 23% depending on the number of expenditures added back. 
3. A strict overall budget for health spending in general, and a series of Medicare 
and Medicaid cost-containment reforms. The primary parts of this proposal are 
reforms to the Sustainable Growth Rate, which is the formula for physician 
payments, and the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) 
Act.  
4. Cuts in additional mandatory spending including: agriculture subsidies, military 
and civil service retirement, student loan programs, pensions, and veteran’s 
benefits. Although these programs are not the primary contributors to rising 
deficits, they are not subject to annual appropriations review. This proposal 
makes oversight and management reforms to these programs. 
5. Social Security reforms, such as gradually increasing the retirement age and the 
implementation of Chained CPI. Chained CPI ties cost of living adjustments for 
Social Security, and other services such as food stamps and veterans benefits, to 
the rate of inflation. It effectively slows the rate at which cost of living 
adjustments increase. 
6. Reforms to the budget process, such as evaluating how OMB and CBO could 
score bills more accurately and implementing cap adjustments for 
appropriations. These proposals are meant to hold the budget process 
accountable for long-term debt and deficit reduction plans. 
                                                          
14 Dennis Ippolito, Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy (West Nyack, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
15 Marc Goldwein and Ed Lorenzen, March 20, 2014. 
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Together these proposals made up a heterodox package. With a combination of both liberal 
and conservative policy preferences such as the discretionary cuts that conservatives supported 
as well as some added revenue that liberals wanted. 
After the Commission and the Future of Simpson-Bowles 
More than a year after Simpson-Bowles presented their “chairmen’s mark” report, 
Representatives Jim Cooper (D-TN) and Steven LaTourette (R-OH) introduced the Cooper-
LaTourette plan, calling it the “Simpson-Bowles Budget.” The legislation only received 38 votes 
in the House, 22 Democrats and 16 Republicans.16 Despite giving it this name, and despite Alan 
Simpson and Erskine Bowles’ support for the package,17 the Cooper-LaTourette plan made 
significant changes to Simpson-Bowles. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities points out 
that Cooper-LaTourette was a more conservative package with “smaller tax increases, smaller 
defense cuts, and deeper domestic cuts than original Simpson-Bowles.”18   
Cooper-LaTourette was defeated in the midst of a Presidential election. At the time, the 
Republican Party wanted to put its bets on the Ryan Budget,19 which relied almost entirely on 
discretionary cuts and delayed reform to such entitlement programs as Social Security and 
Medicare.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Jim Cooper, “Cooper Statement on the Simpson-Bowles Budget Vote” (Press Release, 2012). 
17 Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, “Statement from Sen. Alan Simpson & Erskine Bowles On Budget Alternative 
Proposed by Reps. Steve LaTourette and Jim Cooper,” March 27, 2012. 
18 Robert Greenstein, Cooper-LaTourette Budget Significantly to the Right of Simpson-Bowles Plan (Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities, March 28, 2012). 
19 Representative Paul Ryan (R-WI) is the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, and promoted the House GOP 
Budget Plan. 
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Section I: A “Legislative” History of the Simpson-Bowles Package 
Expectations from the Outset 
The Fiscal Commission started its work in February 2010, with a December 2010 
deadline. The initial outlook on the Commission was varied. Some had high hopes that a 
bipartisan commission with the backing of the White House could offer meaningful solutions 
for our nation’s fiscal challenges. Others were skeptical from the beginning, noting that it was 
unlikely any package could earn the necessary 14 votes.20  
Nevertheless, individuals and organizations from different political perspectives saw a 
variety of possibilities. Advocates for budget reform were glad to see attention paid to the 
issue.  David M. Walker, the head of the Peterson Foundation argued, “Even if they can’t come 
up with 14 of 18 votes, to the extent that they can have an impact on public opinion, that will 
help to prepare the way for tough decisions down the road.”21 Others shared the goal of raising 
awareness about the deficit issue. As Alan Simpson put it, “The American people are going to 
know about a lot more where we are headed with an honest appraisal of our situation and the 
courage to do something about it.”22  
The Commission created some excitement in Washington because those involve were 
committed and the President seemed supportive. One person involved with the Commission 
commented that the staff was “of a single mind that [they] want to accomplish something.”23 
Everyone hoped that this would be what it took to convince Republicans to consider revenue 
increases, and Democrats to accept reforms to entitlement programs. As President Obama 
agreed, “everything has to be on the table.”24  
 
                                                          
20 David Clarke, “Fiscal Commission as Cornerstone,” April 19, 2010. 
21 Ibid. 
22 “Obama Sets Up Debt Panel,” The Caucus, accessed April 16, 2014, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/obama-sets-up-debt-panel/. 
23 Cheri Reidy, April 7, 2014. 
24 Jackie Calmes, “Obama Tells Debt Commission ‘Everything Has to Be on the Table,’” The New York Times, April 
27, 2010, sec. Business / Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/economy/28fiscal.html. 
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Commission Structure 
The Commission was operated with non-partisan staff, hired specifically to work for the 
group, Congressional Members’ committee or personal staff, and some non-congressional 
personal staff. The non-partisan staff came from several outside organizations, and did most of 
the day-to-day work. Since the Commission had a very limited budget, their staffing strategy 
was to bring in individuals who were being paid by a variety of organizations.25  
This staffing strategy had positives and negatives. The Commission, from the beginning, 
was under intense scrutiny for partisanship. About a quarter of the employees were paid by 
outside groups; some of these organizations, including the Committee for a Responsible Federal 
Budget, the Peterson Foundation, and the administration, had their own preferences for 
budget reform. Some, like former Representative Kennelly (D-CT), argued that the staffing 
structure meant the Commission was not truly impartial. Kennelly said, “Taxpayers fund the 
commission and they should work independently of Washington lobbyists and power 
brokers.”26  
Despite the criticism, having a staff from different backgrounds contributed to the 
ideologically diverse make-up of the commission. Executive Director Bruce Reed pointed out, 
“We’ve got wonks from across the spectrum who have been working on this issue for years. 
Every possible voice from left, right, or center has a voice on the commission.”27 Additionally, 
the sponsoring organizations provided valuable resources for the commission. For example, 
staffers commented that they relied on access to the Congressional Budget Office or Office of 
Management and Budget for scoring, the Congressional Research Service for information, and 
think tanks for additional analysis.28  
Initially the commission took a bottom-up approach to its work, hoping that including all 
voting members in each step would encourage more support at the end. Members were 
                                                          
25 Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview; Dan Eggen, “Many Deficit Commission Staffers Paid by Outside Groups,” The 
Washington Post, November 11, 2010, sec. Print Edition, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/10/AR2010111007481.html. 
26 Eggen, “Many Deficit Commission Staffers Paid by Outside Groups.” 
27 Ibid. 
28 Muldoon Meaghan, March 20, 2014; Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview; Congressional Staff, interview. 
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organized into three working groups, addressing discretionary spending, mandatory spending, 
and tax reform and revenue; the mandatory team had a Social Security subgroup.29 Each 
member served in two groups. This structure allowed individuals to focus their efforts on the 
different budget areas that needed to be addressed, and ensured that conversations continued 
in all three areas. 
Staff commented that discussions among the commission working groups were 
generally constructive; members spoke frankly about their concerns and usually demonstrated 
a real commitment to reaching a solution.30 Partisanship, where it existed, was more prevalent 
among House members, especially as the 2010 elections came closer.31 The commission also 
utilized what they called the “Becerra Rule,” which meant nobody would say no to an idea 
unless they could submit a better idea in its place.32 
Development of the Proposals 
 Commissioners pulled ideas from a variety of sources, but all agree that the CBO 
Options Book was the primary source.33 Every one or two years CBO releases a book of policy 
options for reducing the deficit. The commission used these options as the starting point, and 
had discussions to figure out how members felt about each one. Other major sources for policy 
alternatives included the Wyden-Gregg tax reform bill,34 hearings from the Senate Budget 
Committee, and budget think tanks such as the Concord Coalition and CRFB.35 
                                                          
29 “FiscalCommission.gov”; Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
30 Meaghan, interview; Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
31 Conrad, interview. 
32 Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, “Congress, the President Need to Step up to Painful Choices Ahead on 
Budget,” The Hill, February 17, 2011; Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
33 Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014 to 2023, November 2013; Doug Elmendorf, 
“The Economic and Budget Outlook” (Congressional Budget Office, November 24, 2009). 
34 Ron Wyden, “S.3018 - 111th Congress (2009-2010): Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2010,” 
legislation, February 23, 2010, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-
bill/3018/cosponsors?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22Gregg+Wyden+tax%22%5D%7D. 
35 Conrad, interview. 
9 
 
 The progress of different working groups varied. The discretionary and social security 
groups had relative success, while the tax reform and health care groups were effectively 
gridlocked.36  
 The biggest obstacle facing the discretionary group, led by Representative Spratt (D-SC) 
and Senator Coburn (R-OK), was uncertainty about the spending level. However, they were 
successful in negotiating details within a spending plan. They agreed on ten year spending caps 
(with some exemptions within the caps), placed firewalls between security and non-security 
spending, and some smaller efforts intended to lend credibility to the plan such as a federal 
employee pay freeze.37 While never reaching unanimous agreement on a discretionary 
spending plan, meaningful consensus building occurred within the group around a plan that 
allowed spending levels to be added in later. 
  The mandatory group had some success within the Social Security subgroup, primarily 
because Senator Conrad (D-ND) came with a plan to put on the table. The plan provided a 
framework for Social Security reform that many argued was especially conservative for a 
Democrat. It ultimately angered many Democratic members and organizations.38 Senator Gregg 
(R-NH), however, made clear his willingness to compromise on the issue. Having two willing 
negotiators from different parties ensured progress within this group. Senator Conrad’s 
framework was not much different from the final Social Security proposal.39 
 The tax reform group was not as successful. All of the Republicans on the commission 
had signed Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform pledge, promising no tax increases or 
changes in deductions.40 Negotiations on revenue were nearly impossible as a result. Senator 
Coburn (R-OK) showed some willingness to find small amounts of revenue, such as collecting 
                                                          
36 Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.; Lori Montgomery, “Deficit Panel Leaders Propose Curbs on Social Security, Major Cuts in Spending, Tax 
Breaks,” The Washington Post, November 11, 2010, sec. Business, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/10/AR2010111004029.html; Strengthen Social Security, “Senator Conrad’s 
Chairman’s Mark for the FY2013 Senate Budget Resolution Would End Social Security As We Know It,” n.d.; Ryan 
Grim and Michael McAuliff, “Kent Conrad’s Budget Angers Democratic Colleagues,” Huffington Post, May 3, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/03/kent-conrad-budget-angers-democrats_n_857213.html. 
39 Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
40 Grover Norquist, “Taxpayer Protection Pledge,” n.d., http://www.atr.org/about-the-pledge. 
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unpaid taxes from federal employees, but the attempts were minor overall. It became clear 
very quickly that the commission could not propose raising tax rates; any new revenue would 
have to come from tax expenditures and reducing spending in the tax code, but even this 
proved difficult. The problems were so deep that at one point it took a two hour meeting to 
negotiate the number of speakers allowed at their next meeting.41  
 The health reform conversations were just as challenging, or even more gridlocked than 
tax reform. Democrats felt that health reform had been taken care of with the Affordable Care 
Act, and Republicans didn’t want to consider any reforms that weren’t “structural.” In this case, 
structural reforms would have meant repealing the ACA or implementing block grants for 
Medicaid. Even proposals previously supported by Republicans, such as means testing 
Medicare, were now off the table.42 As one former staff member commented, “the scars of 
Obamacare made it impossible for the sides to talk at all.”43 
 As the 2010 elections came closer, the congressional members became less involved. 
Along with the gridlock within many groups, their disengagement sparked a change in the co-
chairs’ strategy. What had been a bottom-up attempt at building a plan switched to a more top-
down approach. With assistance from the non-congressional members, Simpson and Bowles 
put together an ambitious plan based on the working group discussions, but surpassing the 
commission’s original mandate. Most proposals were slight variations of the proposals with a 
consensus around them, but ultimately an executive decision had to be made on revenue.  
 The staff put together three plans, including a modified version of Wyden-Gregg44 and 
an elimination of a few less controversial tax expenditures. During this meeting, to general 
surprise, Bowles proposed what would later be called “the zero plan.”45 By eliminating all tax 
expenditures, setting aside savings for deficit reduction, and forcing Congress to pick and 
                                                          
41 Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Wyden, “S.3018 - 111th Congress (2009-2010).” 
45 The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth; Goldwein and Lorenzen, 
interview. 
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choose the deductions they wanted to put back into the budget, Bowles’ argued that Congress 
would be much more careful about what was added back.46  
Relationships with Outside Interests 
Throughout the process, the commission held monthly public meetings and heard 
testimony from outside groups. Of the outside groups that came to the public meetings, two of 
the more influential were Professors Reinhart and Rogoff from Harvard University.47 They 
presented their research on debt as a share of GDP, making the case that accumulation of debt 
is a risk to economic growth and development. Although their research has since been 
questioned48, at the time it made a lasting impression for the urgency of the commission’s task. 
Other groups tried to have an even bigger hand in the process. Organizations like CRFB, the 
Peterson Foundation, and MacArthur Foundation offered their ideas and support, but the staff 
asserts that they had little influence. The most helpful thing these groups did was make 
supportive statements to the press about the commission’s work. Overall, the commission’s 
approach was very driven by the co-chairs and the non-partisan staff.49  
About two-thirds of the way through the process, the co-chairs hosted a “day of 
listening,” allowing any groups or individuals to come and present their ideas. Both Alan 
Simpson and Erskine Bowles stayed for the entire day, listening to a wide variety of groups 
make policy suggestions.50 The commission made an effort to advertise the hearing to a variety 
of interest groups, especially those representing youth. A lot of entitlement reforms would 
particularly affect the younger generations, and they had been mostly absent from the debate 
up to that point. While a variety of other groups, including labor unions and women’s groups, 
                                                          
46 Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson | 7/21/13 8:52 Pm Edt, “Opinion: ‘Blank Slate’ Key to Tax Reform - Erskine 
Bowles and Alan Simpson,” POLITICO, accessed April 16, 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/blank-
slate-key-to-tax-reform-94526.html. 
47 Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, Working Paper 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639. 
48 John Cassidy, “The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up,” The New Yorker Blogs, April 29, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2013/04/the-rogoff-and-reinhart-controversy-a-summing-
up.html. 
49 Goldwein and Lorenzen, interview. 
50 Meaghan, interview. 
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met with commission staff or attended public hearings, according to staffers interest groups 
had minimal impact on the commission’s final recommendations.51 
Negotiating with Commission Members 
Jean Baptiste Colbert, General of Finance under French King Louis XIV, famously claimed 
that “the art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest possible 
amount of feathers with the smallest possible amount of hissing.”52 This sentiment summarizes 
both the overall goal of the commission, as well as the co-chairs’ strategy in negotiating with 
the congressional members.  
Bowles learned during budget negotiations in the Clinton Administration that the most 
productive strategy was to talk with people one-on-one. Congressional members appreciated 
this approach, as it gave them a real opportunity to ask questions and have their concerns 
heard. It also gave the co-chairs the opportunity to put together a package that could maximize 
support while minimizing changes to the package.53 Between the release of the chairmen’s 
mark54 on November 10 and the release of the final report on December 1 these individual 
negotiations resulted in small tweaks to the package.55 
Commission Vote & Reasoning 
The final commission report was released in a public meeting on December 1, 2010. The 
co-chairs presented the details of the plan and announced that the final vote would be taken 
two days later. Each of the members then made statements, a few were ready to announce 
their vote while others took the additional time to consider.  
Throughout negotiations, Bowles and Simpson had a general idea of where the 
members stood, but they didn’t know the final vote count until the last moment. All of the 
House Republicans voted against the package, while all Senate Republicans supported it. One of 
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the three House Democrats supported it (Representative Spratt (D-SC), the most moderate), 
and two of three Senate Democrats supported; Senator Baucus (D-MT) voted against claiming 
that “the Deficit Commission recommendations would…hit rural America the hardest.”56 Three 
of the four presidentially appointed members supported the package. Andy Stern (former SEIU 
President) did not because of the cuts to Social Security and health care.57 
Senators Conrad (D-ND) and Gregg (R-NH) were the first to endorse the package, 
announcing their support at the December 1st meeting. Mr. Cote, Dr. Rivlin, and Ms. Fudge, all 
followed suit announcing their support. Representative Schakowsky (D-IL) announced that she 
would vote no, and others including: Senator Durbin (D-IL), Representative Spratt (D-SC), and 
Senator Crapo (R-ID) needed additional time to decide.58  
The next day, Senators Coburn (R-OK) and Crapo (R-ID) held a press conference 
announcing their support.59 The 11th, and last, to announce his vote was Senator Dick Durbin 
(D-IL), who submitted an op-ed to the Chicago Tribune titled, “Why I’m Voting ‘yes.’’ His 
support was particularly surprising, which he acknowledged saying, “The question my closest 
political friends are asking is this: Why is a progressive like Dick Durbin voting for this deficit 
commission report?” but ultimately concluding that while, it would take tough choices, “I am 
ready to do my part.”60 
Opposition to Simpson-Bowles 
During his opening statement at the December 1st meeting, Alan Simpson talked about 
the “denizens of darkness…waiting…to shred this baby to bits.”61 He was talking about the 
many interest groups waiting to criticize the package; organizations and individuals who want 
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to see deficit reduction but don’t want their programs touched.62 The criticism of the Simpson-
Bowles package did not end with the commission members. 
The Simpson-Bowles proposals have attracted a lot of opposition from a variety of 
perspectives. Several interest groups opposed portions of the plan. Most notably the AARP, and 
other groups concerned about Social Security and Medicare, disliked the use of chained CPI; 
because it lowers Social Security and Medicare benefits by indexing COLA to the rate of 
inflation.63 
Pundits like Nobel laureate Economist Paul Krugman questioned whether there was 
actually a fiscal crisis, and disliked many of the reforms Simpson-Bowles proposed.64 Krugman 
argued that Reinhart and Rogoff used flawed methods, and that there are no historical 
precedents for fiscal crisis in “a country that has its own currency and borrows in that 
currency.”65 Beyond questioning the motivation for the commission’s work, he also criticized 
the package directly. One column headline reads, “A Public Service Reminder: Simpson-Bowles 
Is Terrible.” He essentially argues that the package offers underwhelming proposals to a non-
existent crisis. 66      
Think tanks with ideological objections to the plan, like Center for American Progress on 
the left and the Heritage Foundation on the right, released their own plans.67 These are much 
more ideologically homogenous proposals representing the more ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ 
preferences in deficit reduction. How to accomplish tax reform is an especially partisan point of 
contention. Republicans do not support tax reform packages that include a net increase in 
revenue, while many Democrats do not support the means of broadening the tax base since it 
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changes where the tax burden rests, and raises distributional concerns. Democrats would 
prefer higher rates for specific groups rather than lower rates across a larger base.68 
Changes Since 2010 
The fiscal situation in the United States has changed since 2010. Especially due to the 
2013 Sequester, discretionary spending goals have been largely met. Medicare growth has also 
slowed in recent years, yet fundamental reform of these programs has not happened.  
Some elements from the Simpson-Bowles package have even been implemented, such 
as: federal pay freezes, establishing a disaster fund, and elimination of earmarks. Others have 
been introduced as bargaining chips in subsequent budget negotiations. Most notably, 
President Obama had included chained CPI in his budget requests (until the FY2015 budget) as 
a signal to Congressional leaders that he was willing to compromise on entitlement reform. So 
far this has not been successful.  
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Section II: The Media Framing of the Simpson-Bowles Package 
The press often refers to Simpson-Bowles in broad, vague, or even misleading terms. 
Some of its proposals are technical and have not seen much coverage. Analyzing local editorials 
how these specifics are, or are not, presented in the media help explain how Simpson-Bowles 
was framed in public opinion, and which individual proposals have received attention in the 
press. More information on media analysis methodology can be found in Appendix B. 
How Simpson-Bowles Was Portrayed 
Coverage while the Fiscal Commission was working, through 2010, was sparse. Trudy 
Lieberman argued in the Columbia Journalism Review that the media did not pay attention to 
the Commission, or what Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles were talking about, in the months 
before release of the Commission Report. However, some in the media who did try follow the 
Commission’s progress didn’t find much to cover between the establishment of the 
Commission and release of the report.69 Lieberman argues that the media seemed surprised, 
especially about the commission’s embrace of the Chained CPI proposal for Social Security.70 
However, it wasn’t until the release that the Commission talked much with the media. 
In the last month of 2010, following the report’s release, several important themes 
emerged when looking at coverage of Simpson-Bowles. National and regional news coverage 
tended to be vague and non-technical, but did harp on the reforms to entitlement programs. 
Lieberman summarizes the coverage saying, “Unsurprisingly, nobody offered the sort of 
informed, comprehensive reporting that Americans need if they are to understand what 
entitlement reform will ultimately mean for them.”71 Lieberman’s assessment includes an 
analysis of AP, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Miami Herald stories, among others. 
Overlooking the impacts of the proposals meant that some important parts of the 
package were left out of the discussion. For example, the media talked about the retirement 
age gradually increasing, changing COLA to effectively reduce benefits, and reducing Social 
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Security benefits for “better-off beneficiaries,”72 but did not talk much about means testing or 
expanding cost-sharing in Medicare.73 
This trend continued beyond the discussion of entitlement reform. Lieberman also 
points out coverage of Simpson-Bowles, when it did include details from the plan, “cherry-
picked” from the many tax reform proposals.74 This picking and choosing method was true both 
of major national news and regional news. Coverage often talked about eliminating some 
mortgage interest exemptions, raising the gasoline tax, and lowering some rates across the 
board.75 For example, in November 2010 the Washington Post summarized the proposal saying 
it would, “impose deep cuts in domestic and military spending…limit or repeal immensely 
popular tax breaks for mortgage interest and employer-provided health insurance to raise 
revenue while keeping income tax rates below their current levels.”76 At the same time, 
coverage in the Denver Post declared that, “The co-chairs seek to simplify the tax code by 
eliminating some tax breaks – like mortgage exemptions…while raising some taxes such as the 
gasoline tax by 15 cents a gallon.”77  
The best examples of this sort of framing are the headlines in regional papers in 
November and December of 2010. The St. Paul Pioneer Press wrote “Proposal has something 
for everyone to hate,”78 The main point was that the criticism of Simpson-Bowles was receiving 
is coming from both sides, which is “a sure indication these ideas are worth considering.”79  
Meanwhile The Denver Post said the report is “taking heat from both sides – and that’s a good 
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thing.”80 These newspapers acknowledged that Simpson-Bowles was a package with proposals 
that both sides disliked, but their argument was that then it must be a true compromise. In 
other words, the whole was greater than the sum of its parts. 
Coverage following the votes initially concluded that just putting the package together 
was a form of success. In most of these cases, the “success” was that a Washington body put 
together something that could be framed as a compromise. 
The newspaper narrative was that Simpson and Bowles rose above partisanship. The 
details of the plan were less important than whether or not politicians are willing to 
compromise. A Wilmington StarNews headline said: “Debt panel has started conversation; will 
nation join?”81 This themed was echoed in a Washington Post editorial arguing the package has 
started an important debate. The editorial wrote: “Let the adult conversation begin.”82 
The St. Paul Pioneer Press shared the belief that the Commission had done good work, 
but argued that it would require a meaningful political endorsement to go anywhere. Thus it 
framed the situation by saying: “Obama urged to breathe life into deficit report.”83 This theme 
was evident in other articles as well, with many local editorials urging their own 
Representatives to show support. The Denver Post said: “[W]e hope Colorado’s elected leaders 
– especially Sen. Michael Bennet…are prepared to push for tough changes.”84 
This media coverage lauded the Commission report as good government, but not 
because it had all good proposals. The press was eager to have something to hold up as a 
moderate, bipartisan, compromise, but this didn’t necessarily mean they were agreeing with 
the specifics of the plan. The Washington Post put it bluntly saying, “We expect nearly everyone 
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will find a gored ox about which to howl.”85 In the year following the report’s release, this 
frame did not change much. 
The coverage throughout 2011 essentially concluded that the Simpson-Bowles 
recommendations had died. An editorial in the St. Paul Pioneer Press said that Congress would 
need to “dust off”86 the proposals. The Wenatchee World said: “The Simpson-Bowles plan, 
described as a last-ditch do-it-or-else means to avoid catastrophe, is sitting on a shelf where it 
will sit forevermore.”87 Discussion of Simpson-Bowles usually appeared in articles that had a 
larger focus, such as the “Fiscal Cliff”88 or the Bipartisan Budget “Supercommittee.”89 
Newspapers continued to hold Simpson-Bowles up as the only example of a good bipartisan 
proposal to address the debt and proof that lawmakers are putting off necessary debt and 
deficit reduction measures. 
Lieberman at CJR points out that while the media was busy framing Simpson-Bowles as 
a centrist plan, it overlooked some of the strongest criticism.90 They argue that the media 
essentially wrote off Economist Paul Krugman as a critic of the Simpson-Bowles report. CJR 
suggest that some in the media have started “what’s effectively a campaign for Simpson-
Bowles”91 while wrongfully assuming that it is hard to find other prominent economists who 
agree with Krugman’s perspective.  
Lieberman was not alone in noticing this trend. Other journalists, especially online 
writers, have also started to question the extent to which Simpson-Bowles really accomplishes 
everything the media are claiming. An article published in Salon in 2012 says that Simpson-
Bowles is “what you want it to be. It will fix the deficit and grow the economy and it does it 
without raising taxes on anyone, unless you want to raise taxes on some people, and then it 
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does that.”92 While this particular article may be a little hyperbolic, it does represent a growing 
area of media coverage.  
Paul Krugman has also been critical of the media’s take on Simpson-Bowles; he argues 
that journalists used to talk about ideas as centrist when they could earn bipartisan support. 
Now, he argues, “the term ‘centrist’ is used for things like Simpson-Bowles, which are both 
desperately unpopular and impossible to enact as legislation.”93 While the media has lauded 
Simpson-Bowles for being bipartisan and moderate, this frame may not hold up indefinitely.  
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Section III: The Public Response to the Simpson-Bowles Package 
Polling data will help inform why the Simpson-Bowles package has not yet been 
endorsed by most politicians, whether the discussion surrounding them has caused a shift in 
overall public concern for the fiscal problems, and how the proposals can be framed more 
successfully in the future. If the proposals are still viable, advocates may need to change the 
way they are talking about them. 
Findings from Public Polling Data 
 A Pew Research Poll taken in the first week of December 2010, the same week the 
commission report was released, showed that 70% of Americans considered the deficit a major 
problem that we must address now, while 23% thought it was a major problem but should be 
addressed when the economy is better. Only 6% of Americans did not think the deficit is a 
major issue.94  
 The polling on the deficit made it clear that the American public considered this an 
urgent issue.  However, when asked about Simpson-Bowles as a solution to this problem, Pew 
found that only 30% approved of the “deficit commission’s proposals,” while 48% disapproved, 
and 21% didn’t know.95 Since this question was asked the week that the commission voted on 
their final package, these numbers show that initial reactions by the public were primarily 
negative but awareness of the package was very high.  
  Pew also asked respondents about specific provisions within Simpson-Bowles. Overall, 
they found that people supported the federal salaries freeze, an increase in taxes on high 
income earners, and increasing the Social Security cap for the most affluent. On the other hand, 
they found a tax on employer-provided health insurance, an increase in the gas tax, a reduction 
in federal funding to states, and an increase in Medicare contributions were “totally 
unacceptable” to most people (defined as 60% to 75% of people). Even when offered a direct 
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choice between maintaining Social Security and Medicare benefits and reducing the budget 
deficit, Americans from every age group showed higher support for keeping benefits.96  
 Two years after the commission vote, in December 2012, Public Policy Polling released a 
poll showing that only 23% of the public supported Simpson-Bowles. However, the most 
notable change from the 2010 polling was not a decline in support, but the number of people 
who neither supported nor opposed the plan. PPP found that 60% are “not sure” of their 
opinion on Simpson-Bowles,97 nearly 40 percentage points higher than the 21% in 2010.98 As 
seen in the media analysis section, by 2012 the reporting on the package had subsided, and the 
coverage it did get was vague. The number of people with no opinion may be primarily 
reflective of the lack of detailed information available to the public about the plan. 
Another way to look at these findings is to highlight that 40% of Americans were aware 
of the plan, and the majority of those with an opinion supported it.99 This trend is consistent 
with the findings of the media analysis. It suggests that the coverage of the issue may have 
permeated public opinion. The media attention was generally positive, but vague, and placed 
within the “good government” frame. It follows that the majority of people who knew about 
the package would see it favorably. However, it also follows that many people would feel they 
have no opinion about a package they had few details about. 
PPP also ran a poll asking how people felt about the Panetta-Burns plan, a package that 
PPP made-up for the purpose of the poll. They found that about 25% of people had some 
opinion about a plan that did not exist.100  These responses are paradoxical in many ways. It is 
unclear if Simpson-Bowles was known by the public, or if respondents were just claiming to 
have an opinion about anything. The question wording also does not make it clear that the 
plans are meant to be debt/deficit reduction strategies. If it had been presented in this way, the 
responses may have changed.  
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Only the early Pew poll provides an indication of whether or not the public actually 
knew what is in the package, or if they really supported the individual proposals. Even the Pew 
poll asking about specific elements didn’t fully explain the proposal, the tradeoffs, or the 
objectives. While broad public polling data puts in perspective the public’s response to 
Simpson-Bowles, it does not really explain public opinion about the proposals specifically. 
How to Talk About Simpson-Bowles 
 More specific polling, and focus group, questions that asks about very specific policy 
proposals better highlights how people view the provisions within Simpson-Bowles, and the 
different approaches to deficit reduction overall. In 2013 CRFB’s Fix the Debt Campaign 
conducted a series of polls and focus groups that measured public responses when the 
proposals within the Simpson-Bowles package were presented in different ways. A 
methodological discussion on the Fix the Debt poll can be found in Appendix C.  
 One prominent finding from these polls is the attitudes toward Social Security and 
Medicare reforms. When asked about changes to Social Security and Medicare “as part of a 
comprehensive plan to help reduce the national debt” 57% of people were opposed.101 This 
finding is supported by Pew polls that found 58% of Americans prioritized Social Security and 
Medicare benefits over deficit reduction.102  
 Responses to questions proposing Medicare reforms changed dramatically after 
including qualifiers. When asked if the changes “were gradually phased in over years and did 
not impact anyone currently 60 or over” respondents’ levels of support jumped up to 55%. That 
level increases even farther to 61% when asked if changes also included cuts in “wasteful 
government spending” and closing of tax loopholes for the wealthy.103 Support for Chained CPI 
also changed depending on how the proposal was justified. When asked if they would support 
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reducing the cost of living increases if a portion of the savings went toward “protect[ing] low-
income seniors and older seniors” the levels of support are 65%.104  
 Although the changes in support for other proposals weren’t as dramatic as the 
entitlement programs, they followed a similar trend. The more proposals were packaged 
together with other policies, especially when there was an effort to increase support for lower 
income or otherwise vulnerable groups, the more support they earned. This trend held true in 
the polling and the focus groups.  
 In the focus groups, the same types of questions were asked, and participants discussed 
their reactions to the proposals. Groups were differentiated by self-identified Democrats and 
Republicans. The Democrats tended to react negatively to proposals that they felt would hurt 
particularly disadvantaged individuals. They generally disliked the proposals reforming 
entitlement programs, but were amenable to Chained CPI when it was framed as about “$3.00-
$3.50 less a month” or when the current method is framed as “inaccurate.”105  
Republicans tended to react negatively to any proposals that raised revenue, but 
became more receptive to the idea if it new revenue was going directly to debt relief rather 
than other government spending. Similarly, this group became more willing to reform Social 
Security and Medicare when it was made clear how the reforms would lead to savings. 106  
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 The Winston Group, Democrats Focus Group (Alexandria, VA, 2013). 
106 The Winston Group, Republicans Focus Group (Orlando, FL, 2013). 
25 
 
Section IV: The Simpson-Bowles Package & The Policy Stream: Are They Still Alive? 
Supposed “Death” of Simpson-Bowles 
The current state, and future, of the Simpson-Bowles package appears uncertain at best. 
Ippolito points out that “While the Simpson-Bowles report, as it was christened, would serve as 
a useful benchmark for future deficit-reduction proposals, its immediate impact was 
minimal.”107 This sentiment was the general consensus within a year of the report release. After 
the commission vote in December 2010, many pundits perceived the Simpson-Bowles package 
“failed” if not outright “dead.”108 The sentiment was widespread enough to motivate Simpson 
and Bowles, even two years later, to continue their efforts, as Bowles put it in November 2012, 
to “don’t let this thing die.”109  
Ippolito further asserts that the lack of 14 votes from the Commission’s members was 
not the biggest problem that Simpson-Bowles had. Rather, the less than enthusiastic response 
from all sides, especially President Obama, is what doomed the proposals.110 Many agree that 
the President was partially responsible for the supposed death of the package.111 Bowles and 
Simpson wrote an op-ed in February 2011 called “Congress, the president need to step up to 
painful choices ahead on budget” suggesting that Obama had not yet stepped up. While 
campaigning in 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney said the President “simply 
                                                          
107 Dennis Ippolito, Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy. 
108 “Pumping Life into a Deficit Plan Thought Dead,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser (HI), November 28, 2012, 
http://docs.newsbank.com.proxy.lib.duke.edu/s/InfoWeb/aggdocs/NewsBank/142E2F924DE05670/0D0CB4F32A2
1A855?s_lang. 
109 NEW YORK TIMES, “Pair Try to Pump Life Back into Their Deficit Plan,” Houston Chronicle (TX), December 7, 
2012, 3 STAR edition. 
110 Dennis Ippolito, Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy. 
111 Erik Wasson, “Geithner explains why Obama never embraced Bowles-Simpson,” Text, TheHill, February 16, 
2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/budget/211153-geithner-explains-why-obama-never-embraced-
bowles-simpson; Ezra Klein, “The Reason the White House Didn’t Embrace Simpson-Bowles,” The Washington Post 
- Blogs, February 27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the-reason-the-white-house-
didnt-embrace-simpson-bowles/2011/08/25/gIQAq1j2dR_blog.html; Jackie Calmes, “Obama’s Unacknowledged 
Debt to Bowles-Simpson Plan,” The New York Times, February 27, 2012, sec. U.S. / Politics, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/us/politics/obamas-unacknowledged-debt-to-bowles-simpson-plan.html; 
“The Real Reason Obama Wouldn’t Embrace Simpson-Bowles,” Forbes, accessed April 17, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshbarro/2012/02/27/the-real-reason-obama-wouldnt-embrace-simpson-bowles/. 
26 
 
brushed aside” Simpson-Bowles.112 Around the same time Forbes Magazine and Ezra Klein both 
published articles speculating about the President’s reasons for not endorsing Simpson-
Bowles.113 
President Obama wasn’t willing to concede that he had given up on the package. In 
February 2012 the President asked Erskine Bowles to lunch at the White House, where he tried 
to assure Bowles that he hadn’t given up on the package. Bowles summarized the President’s 
feelings saying, “The president wanted to make sure that we understood that he had had a 
strategy to take the framework of what we’d negotiated.”114 The President, as well as Klein, 
argued that the political situation prohibited an immediate endorsement of the package, but 
nobody has ruled out a future. 
Where the Package is Alive 
Another part of the Simpson-Bowles story is what has happened outside of the public’s 
eye. The public narrative, as seen in the media coverage and polling data, makes a convincing 
case for why the proposals have failed, but that isn’t the whole story. Although they have not 
been implemented as a whole package, certain proposals such as chained CPI for Social Security 
benefits were, until this year, included in the President’s Budget. Obama included chained CPI 
for the budget cycles following the fiscal commission in an effort to demonstrate his willingness 
to compromise on entitlement reform. Furthermore, there was likely more support in Congress 
for the Cooper-LaTourette plan, but the political timing got in the way. Finally, at many of the 
budget negotiation meetings between the White House and Congress, or between the House 
and Senate leadership over the past couple years, the Simpson-Bowles proposals have been on 
the table as negotiation points.115 The policy stream behind these proposals may still be alive. 
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Beyond the actual policy recommendations in Simpson-Bowles, the report has also 
become an authority for measuring the fiscal situation. Not only have the proposals remained 
on the table in subsequent budget negotiations, but the commission’s analysis of the fiscal 
situation made a lasting impression. Simpson-Bowles’ target of where our spending as a 
percentage of GDP should be to maintain fiscal sustainability have been picked up by other 
groups. Simpson-Bowles set the goal at 22 percent from 2012 to 2020, and the Bipartisan Policy 
Center proposal, President Obama’s budgets, and the House Republican plan have all placed 
the targets in the same range; their proposals came as a response to the fiscal commission’s 
analysis.116 
Policy Streams & the Garbage Can Model 
Conventional “School House Rock,”117 wisdom and basic civics presents policymaking as 
a straightforward process: a great idea turns into a great policy, passes through Congress to the 
President, and voila! you’ve fixed a problem. Unfortunately this model does not accurately 
explain how most policy ideas are received. Political science literature provides a variety of 
explanations of how and why the Simpson-Bowles policy proposals didn’t yet pass but remain 
alive.  
Most prominently, Kingdon’s description of policy streams and the Garbage Can Model 
of policymaking (explained in-depth below) apply here.118 These theories explain how policies 
can remain alive, waiting for a time when they are needed or more politically feasible. 
Additionally, Hubbard and Kane present an argument specific to the fiscal situation. They talk 
about how the Prisoner’s Dilemma can explain why policymakers who might otherwise agree 
on the necessary policies for fiscal reform are making rational decisions by not implementing 
them right now.119 Policymakers might not support comprehensive fiscal reform right now, but 
the Simpson-Bowles proposals could be the alternatives on the table when they are ready. 
                                                          
116 Dennis Ippolito, Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy. 
117 Dave Frishberg, I’m Just a Bill, 1975. 
118 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2003; Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen, 
“A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,” Administrative Science Quarterly, n.d., 1–25. 
119 Tim Kane and Glenn Hubbard, “Regaining America’s Balance,” National Affairs 8 (2013). 
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Kingdon adapted the garbage can model, originated by Cohen, March, and Olsen120, to 
apply to the federal government. Kingdon presents three “streams” that explain how issues do, 
or do not, move through government processes. Kingdon’s streams are: “problem recognition, 
the formation and refining of policy proposals, and politics.”121 The problem stream explains 
how and why different issues come to the attention of policymakers; the policy stream 
describes the process by which policy proposals are generated; the politics stream addresses 
the influence of public opinion, elections, and political leadership.  As Kingdon summarizes, 
“Separate streams run through the organization, each with a life of its own. These streams are 
coupled at critical junctures, and that coupling produces the greatest agenda change.”122 When 
an urgent problem meets a policy solution and the political timing is right, the idea comes out 
of the garbage can and stands a chance at passage. Until the three streams come together, the 
idea may be perceived as “dead” while waiting for the right timing. 
Applying this model to the Simpson-Bowles package can explain its perceived “death” 
and its possible future. In this case, the fiscal situation represents the problem stream; the fiscal 
commission, their process, and the resulting package is the policy; and the climate in Congress 
and the Obama Administration are the politics. Each stream is, as Kingdon prescribes, working 
independently and overlapping at key moments.  
Cohen, March, and Olsen characterize the garbage can as a place with “collections of 
choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they 
might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and decision 
makers looking for work.”123 In the case of Simpson-Bowles, the fiscal problem existed before 
the commission, motivating its creation. At this stage the problem and policy streams 
overlapped. However, the package never received the political endorsements it needed.  
Looking at Kingdon’s model answers whether or not the Simpson-Bowles package is still 
alive. The answer is yes. Simpson-Bowles, when considered as a policy stream, is still alive. 
                                                          
120 Cohen, March, and Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” 
121 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Cohen, March, and Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice.” 
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Furthermore, our country continues to face a difficult fiscal situation, keeping the problem 
stream alive as well. The only thing missing is the political endorsements. The package is in the 
garbage can, waiting for the window when all three streams coincide. 
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Section V: Simpson-Bowles: Lessons Learned 
The lessons learned in the previous sections highlight what sort of political strategies 
can help advance the Simpson-Bowles package in the future. Recommendations include media 
strategy, ways to frame the policy proposals, and political timing.  
Finding the Political Window 
Simpson-Bowles lost a lot of traction because it lacked the right political endorsements. 
Support from the President is especially crucial to any success of the package. When the 
commission got started, many believed if it was successful it would be because it had the 
backing of the President.124 When the final report did not receive either the required 14 votes 
on the commission or a Presidential endorsement, the policy went back into the garbage can.125 
Many of those involved with the commission or reporting on it agree that if Simpson-
Bowles has a future it has to come from the President, and most likely a new one.126 This means 
that the political window is unlikely to open before 2016.   
Honing a Media & Public Opinion Strategy 
It may be effective to frame Simpson-Bowles as good government, but to avoid equating 
that with claims that it is a centrist or moderate policy. Eventually it may become clear that 
these claims lack depth. 
The good news for Simpson-Bowles is that it has earned the reputation of symbolizing 
good government and compromise. The bad news for future promotion of the package is that 
the coverage has not fully explained all sides, nor given enough airtime to the plan’s critics. 
Ultimately, the “good government” reputation may get you part of the way but that argument 
won’t sustain Simpson-Bowles unless people understand what’s in it. 
                                                          
124 Reidy, interview. 
125 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
126 Reidy, interview; Montgomery, interview; Conrad, interview. 
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 Polling trends generally support what is in the media. There is a significant percentage of 
the population that is aware and supportive of Simpson-Bowles. However, having a longer and 
more specific conversation about the issues at stake and the tradeoffs involved in any given 
proposal increases support dramatically. Understanding the best ways to talk about Simpson-
Bowles with the public could have tremendous effects on the future success of the package. 
The analysis of the polling data reveal that the more specific the question, the more 
support it earned. Additionally, while the focus groups don’t necessarily highlight a magic 
method of framing Simpson-Bowles, it is clear that certain arguments work better with 
different audiences. Similarly, it is clear that more discussion about the issue makes people 
more amenable to the proposals. As more individual policy tradeoffs are introduced and 
discussed, the more people support the whole package. To really earn support for Simpson-
Bowles, it needs to be discussed specifically but also holistically.  
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Appendix A: Make-up of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 
 
Members of Congress Appointed by Congressional Leadership: 
Republican Senators 
 Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) 
 Sen. Mike Crapo (R-ID) 
 Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH) 
Democratic Senators 
 Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT) 
 Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND) 
 Sen. Richard Durbin (D-IL) 
Republican Representatives 
 Rep. Dave Camp (R-MI 4) 
 Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX 5) 
 Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI 1) 
Democratic Representatives 
 Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-CA 31) 
 Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL 9) 
 Rep. John Spratt (D-SC 5) 
 
Members Appointed by President Obama: 
 David Cote, Chairman and CEO, Honeywell International 
 Ann Fudge, Former CEO, Young & Rubicam Brands 
 Alice Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute and former Director, Office of 
Management & Budget 
 Andrew Stern, President, Service Employees International Union  
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Appendix B: Media Analysis Methodology 
 
Media Analysis Methods 
 
To get an initial snapshot of what has been done to analyze how the media covered 
Simpson-Bowles. Columbia Journalism Review articles monitor and analyze media coverage. I 
did a search for “Simpson-Bowles” appearing in CJR articles. These articles point out some 
initial themes on how the press talked about the Simpson-Bowles report. 
To confirm the trends CJR identified, I did my own search using the database NewsBank. I 
searched for instances between January 2010 and December 2011 where “Simpson-Bowles” 
was mentioned in local or regional papers. I focused on local editorials, discounting any 
syndicated columns, to see how newspaper outside the major national publications received 
Simpson-Bowles. Generally these findings supported the themes CJR discussed, but the content 
of local editorials also portrayed the national attitude toward Simpson-Bowles. 
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Appendix C: Fix the Debt Polling & Focus Group Methodology 
 
Fix the Debt Poll Methods 
 Respondents were called using both landlines and cell phones. The sample size was 800 
likely 2014 voters. Calls were made between October 4 and 8, 2013.  
Focus Groups 
 The two focus groups referenced in this paper were conducted in Alexandria, Virginia 
(Democrats) and Orlando, Florida (Republicans). They were approximately two hours in length. 
The Republican group had 7 participants, and the Democratic group had 10 participants. 
 
